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Abstract 45 
 46 
Despite the rapid rise in public expenditure on clean energy infrastructure, there has been 47 
little discussion about what constitutes a fair distribution of this new spending burden.  We 48 
examine four ethical principles that speak to different notions of fairness in the way this 49 
burden can and should be shared, and use them to produce three normative criteria for 50 
pursuing fairness in the clean energy fiscal policy context.  We use these criteria to examine 51 
the extent to which fairness is being achieved in large clean energy roll-out programs in 52 
Australia, California and the United Kingdom.  Maintaining a close focus on providing 53 
practical guidance for decision makers in similar policy contexts, we find that fairness is 54 
more achievable when program design explicitly considers which households should pay for 55 
the program and which should be exempt; when the idea of proportionality guides the 56 
distribution of the cost across paying households, and when the interests of low-income 57 
households are protected, by ensuring that they share in the benefits of the program, for 58 
example. 59 
 60 
JEL: D63, H23, H54, O2, Q48, Q5 61 
 62 
Key words: environmental taxes and subsidies, distributional impacts, equity, energy policy, 63 
renewable energy.   64 
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‘A policy that averted dangerous climate change would nonetheless be unfair if the duties to 166 
mitigate and adapt were unfairly distributed.  It is not enough to devise efficient policy 167 
proposals for they might be thoroughly unjust in their distribution of the costs.’ (Caney 2009: 168 
127) 169 
 170 
‘No solution of a practical problem, relating to human conduct, can be regarded as complete, 171 
until its ethical aspects have been considered.  It is clear, accordingly, that practical 172 
discussions of an economic character cannot be isolated from ethics, except in so far as the 173 
aim is merely to point out the practical bearing of economics facts, without any attempt to lay 174 
down absolute rules of conduct.’  (Keynes 1917: 60-61) 175 
 176 
 177 
1. Motivation and background 178 
 179 
This paper considers how policymakers can ensure greater fairness in the way the large new 180 
cost of paying for clean energy infrastructure is distributed across socioeconomic groups.  181 
  182 
We start from the premise that the level of clean energy capital spending globally is projected 183 
to grow from an estimated USD 214 billion in 2014 to USD 300 billion by 2020 (IEA/OECD 184 
2014) and that very little public discussion has focused on what might constitute a fair 185 
distribution of this spending burden.  Some modelling work suggests that investment levels 186 
would need to reach USD 1.1 trillion annually, in order to achieve mitigation consistent with 187 
a 2-degree target (McCollum et al 2014).1  Distributive concerns are material here because 188 
this investment tends to be motivated into existence by government subsidies, and the cost of 189 
these subsidies tends in turn to be passed on to either tax payers or electricity utility 190 
customers.  Evidence suggests that the distribution of the costs and benefits of these subsidies 191 
across socioeconomic groups is not being taken adequately into account, including in 192 
programs in Australia (Macintosh and Wilkinson 2010), the United Kingdom (Grover 2013) 193 
and California (Proctor 2014) that we consider in this paper.   194 
 195 
                                                 
1 These types of estimates are static and tend not to account for general equilibrium responses from 
carbon pricing policies or capital cost changes for example, and the need to account for the final 
incidence as opposed to the proximate incidence is something we discuss more below. 
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The question of fairness in sharing this new cost also sits in a context of historically high and 196 
rising income inequality (since the early 1900s)  in several of the countries leading the clean 197 
energy investment charge.  These include Germany, Norway and the United States (OECD 198 
2008; OECD 2011; Piketty 2014; Piketty and Saez 2003; US Census Bureau 2011).  In line 199 
with the quotation from political philosopher Simon Caney (2009) in the header above, it 200 
seems to us that policies that succeed in mitigating GHG pollution should not do so in a way 201 
that worsens socioeconomic inequality. 202 
 203 
This paper extends a growing literature about fairness in distributing the cost of mitigating 204 
(GHG) pollution more generally.  Climate change economics research has turned to moral 205 
philosophy in recent years for guidance in deciding how much the current generation should 206 
be asked to pay to mitigate future pollution damages (Nordhaus 2008; Stern 2014; Weitzman 207 
2007).  Moral philosophers have at the same time been developing a ‘climate justice’ 208 
narrative around the closely related question of who should pay for mitigation or any other 209 
action necessary to keep global warming from becoming any more harmful than necessary 210 
(Shue 2010, Caney 2009).  These theoretical discussions do not always offer tangible 211 
guidance for policymakers on how fairness might look in practical terms, however.   212 
 213 
A substantial body of applied research has examined the distributional incidence of policies 214 
designed to mitigate harm from environmental pollution, including harm arising from GHG 215 
pollution (Smith 1992; Grainger and Kolstad 2009; Metcalf et al 2010; Fullerton 2011).  216 
Some of this concern with fairness arose in response to the environmental justice research 217 
that emerged in the 1980s.  This work demonstrated that systematic inequalities exist in who 218 
bears the exposure cost of pollution across racial, ethnic, and income groups (Rhodes 2003; 219 
Schlosberg 2007), but also in who enjoys the protective benefits of anti-pollution policy 220 
(Bullard 1994).  In part to guide policymakers on achieving environmentally just outcomes 221 
from policy, several ideas have been developed about what constitutes fairness in 222 
environmental policy design, including in this journal (Neumayer 2000; Pascual 2010; 223 
Pelletier 2010).  224 
 225 
This prior work takes us some way to understanding the broad contours of how distributive 226 
fairness might look in policy contexts involving environmental policy and pollution, but not 227 
all the way to distributing the clean energy infrastructure burden specifically.  The question, 228 
therefore, that we set out to answer in this paper is, ‘What practical guidance can be drawn 229 
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from existing principles of distributive justice for fairly sharing the cost of clean energy 230 
infrastructure?’ 231 
 232 
The next section sets up a framework for answering this question in a way that we hope will 233 
yield useful guidance for policymakers who work on related policy issues.  Section 3 234 
analyses what four established principles of distributive fairness have to say about achieving 235 
fairness in the clean energy context.  Section 4 derives from the principles three normative 236 
criteria for evaluating fairness in policy design.  Against these criteria, Section 5 evaluates 237 
clean energy roll-out programs focused on household and small-scale deployment in 238 
Australia, California and the United Kingdom.  Section 6 summarizes and caveats our 239 
findings, and recaps how decision makers might apply them. 240 
 241 
 242 
2. Framework for analysis 243 
 244 
Our aim is to establish a practical, implementable moral basis for fairly distributing the cost 245 
of just one increasingly common approach to mitigating GHG pollution - deploying new 246 
clean energy infrastructure.  In discussing how this new cost should be shared we are treading 247 
on the kind of normative ground that standard approaches in neoclassical economic analysis 248 
are not particularly well suited to answering (Stern 2014).  In order to establish something 249 
akin to widely acceptable prescriptive judgments about the desirability of different 250 
distributive outcomes from policy, we therefore need to go beyond a positivist analysis of 251 
‘facts’. 252 
 253 
To do this we engage with several of the philosophical principles that are coloring the climate 254 
change mitigation debate.  Our treatment of these principles may seem sparse to scholars of 255 
ethics, but for economists and policy-makers who are currently discussing these issues 256 
minimally if at all, we expect that a discussion focused mainly on the principles’ instrumental 257 
value will go some way to raising the standard of that discussion.  Those interested in the 258 
principles’ deeper underpinnings and in principles other than the ones we have identified as 259 
most relevant to this normative problem, can consult the references cited. 260 
 261 
We have chosen to frame our question mainly in terms of the fair distribution of a new cost or 262 
burden associated at least in part with mitigating GHG emissions, but we are aware that the 263 
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question could also be framed in terms of fairly distributing the benefits of clean energy 264 
infrastructure itself.  One reason that we chose the costs framing is because we felt that there 265 
could be greater consequence for vulnerable social groups to an inequitable distribution of 266 
costs than to an inequitable distribution of benefits.  New costs seem more likely to affect 267 
current welfare levels of these groups in absolute terms.  However, in both the discussion of 268 
distributive principles and in the evaluation of actual policies, we try to account for how 269 
program benefits flow to low-income groups when they do, not least as ‘negative costs’.  270 
Another reason for our costs-focused approach is that decision-makers in this context 271 
typically have greater control over how the cost of clean energy infrastructure policies are 272 
spread than over who participates in them and therefore who benefits. 273 
 274 
In any discussion of distributive outcomes it is important to distinguish between a policy’s 275 
proximate (or immediate) impact, and its final (or ultimate) incidence (Fullerton and Metcalf 276 
2002).  It is possible, indeed common, for a policy to satisfy common notions of fairness in 277 
its immediate impact but result in an unfair final incidence (Kotlikoff and Summers 1987).  278 
This can happen when the agents who are directly liable to pay the new cost or tax shift it 279 
forward or backward through asset price adjustments and/or because the new cost may cause 280 
equilibrium adjustments that alter factor prices themselves (Kotlikoff and Summers 1987).  281 
Our view is that decision-makers should aim to achieve a fair ultimate incidence in the 282 
policies they design, but we also recognize that this is not always an easy ask.  Technical aids 283 
to policy design like detailed regulatory impact assessment and computable general 284 
equilibrium (CGE) modelling will often be necessary to ensure that this outcome is fully 285 
achieved over different time horizons and economic sectors.  Our primary aim in this paper is 286 
to direct decision makers’ attention to notions of fairness in the proximate distribution of 287 
public costs, which we see as an important first step towards realising fairness also in the 288 
ultimate sense.  We emphasize this and other caveats to policy implementation and design in 289 
the conclusions section. 290 
 291 
We have limited the scope of our analysis in several important ways in order to place clear 292 
boundaries on our question and to produce meaningful guidance for policymakers.  We do 293 
not address the question of who should bear responsibility for historical GHG pollution or 294 
what a fair shouldering mitigating its damage should look like.  This is because clean energy 295 
infrastructure by definition only mitigates current and future pollution.  We also focus on the 296 
question of distributive fairness within the current generation rather than the between-297 
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generations question.  This is because inter-generational burden-sharing is well covered in the 298 
debate over how to discount avoided climate damages (Arrow et al 2014) and because intra-299 
generational burden sharing is most relevant to the financial scale of the policies we consider 300 
empirically.  We also limit our discussion to how the cost should be shared across people 301 
within individual countries.  This is because building clean energy infrastructure has to date 302 
been almost exclusively the domain of national or sub-national governments.  However, there 303 
is considerable overlap between the principles we consider here and the principles that might 304 
guide a fair distribution of the GHG pollution mitigation burden across countries (Ringius et 305 
al (2002)2, and there is nothing to prevent our analysis from informing the international 306 
burden sharing discussion, particularly insofar as it concerns international transfers to support 307 
clean energy deployment. 308 
 309 
Our analysis is particularly relevant to questions of cost distribution under clean energy 310 
programs insofar as these programs are motivated into existence by GHG mitigation. In 311 
practice, governments are rolling out clean energy infrastructure with diverse motivations: to 312 
mitigate GHG pollution, to promote innovation and competitiveness, to improve the security 313 
and stability of electricity supply through distributed generation, to reduce geopolitical 314 
vulnerability by diversifying fuel sources, and for other reasons (DECC 2011, EC 2014).    315 
That does not mean that our analysis is irrelevant to questions of fairness where the other 316 
motives are present.  It means that we see GHG mitigation – whether it be through displacing 317 
fossil fuel-fired generation in the near term, or through enabling this to happen in the future 318 
by way of stimulating innovation – as the motive that sets clean energy policy apart from 319 
other types of energy infrastructure policy, and which therefore invites us to think about how 320 
                                                 
2 Ringius et al offer an excellent example of how fairness principles can be used to guide the 
distribution of GHG mitigation costs in an international climate policy negotiation context.  Several of 
the principles that they find relevant to that discussion are similar in spirit to the ones we consider in 
this paper.  However, there are several reasons why what is deemed a fair distribution of a burden 
among nations may not be seamlessly transferable to a within-country context where the concern is 
with distributive fairness among households.  First, a prominent argument in the international context 
is that which appeals to the notion of a historical balance of justice and nations’ interest in 
development and industrialization.  This argument suggests that less developed countries should be 
allowed to enjoy the same emissions levels today that developed countries historically have done.  At 
the level of households within a country this kind of historical comparison is much less relevant.  
Second, given that the lifetime of nations is typically much longer than that of persons, international 
burden sharing necessarily takes a longer-term perspective and therefore must include a consideration 
for climate change damage costs as well as mitigation costs.  However, the immediate question for 
policymakers tasked with distributing the cost of clean energy infrastructure is principally a question 
about distributing a mitigation costs. 
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this relatively novel motive may change our ideas about who should pay for this 321 
infrastructure. 322 
 323 
A final way that we limit the scope of the analysis is by thinking about fairness in this context 324 
separately from other policies and programs that are designed to help low-income households 325 
specifically, such as fuel bill assistance to elderly households or winterization subsidies for 326 
low-income households.  One could argue that if one policy is excessively fiscally regressive 327 
(infrastructure), and another is excessively progressive (fuel bill assistance), then the score is 328 
even all things considered.  We do not dispute this point.  It may be true that 329 
counterbalancing measures already exist outside of the clean energy infrastructure policy 330 
context or that it is desirable to create these measures.  Our point is that in order to decide 331 
whether sufficient compensating measures already exist, or should exist, it is first necessary 332 
to have some notion of whether the cost of this new infrastructure is itself being distributed 333 
fairly or not.3 334 
 335 
3. Principles of distributive fairness 336 
 337 
Through a review of the distributive justice literature related to climate change and the 338 
environment we identified three principles that seemed relevant and flexible enough to 339 
address the question.  They are the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), the Ability To Pay 340 
Principle (ATPP), and the Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP). They are articulated in the 341 
literature in different variations and they are possible to combine, but they are also 342 
sufficiently distinct to be treated as separate. We further consider the Grandfathering 343 
Principle (GFP).  While GFP is rarely advocated by ethicists or moral philosophers, it is 344 
commonly used in GHG control policies to initially distribute the right to pollute (Ellerman et 345 
al 2007; Rode 2014).  There are certainly other principles that could be brought to bear on the 346 
question, but we deemed these four the most relevant to distributing an environmental 347 
protection-related burden across socioeconomic groups within a country and within a single 348 
generation.4 349 
                                                 
3 This raises the important point that program-level assessments of the distributional impact of clean 
energy infrastructure are inherently embedded in larger policy decisions about how the national tax 
burden is shared.  
 
4 One fairness notion that we considered but did not pursue was the idea of collective moral 
responsibility.  Collective moral responsibility holds that group entities like governments or clans or 
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 350 
For each principle we consider the basic position it holds on who should bear the GHG 351 
mitigation burden, major objections or weaknesses to the principle, and how policy and the 352 
distributive outcome might look in practical terms if the burden was distributed in line solely 353 
with the principle. 354 
 355 
3.1. Polluter Pays Principle 356 
 357 
PPP holds that an agent who is responsible for emitting pollution should also be responsible 358 
for remedying the damage caused by the pollution.  The more pollution an agent emits 359 
generally, the more they are liable to pay to remedy the damage.  The principle generally 360 
holds that the sum that a polluter pays should be enough to redress all the harm they cause 361 
(IPCC 2001; Schwartz 2010). 362 
 363 
An attractive feature of PPP as a principle for distributing the cost of clean energy 364 
infrastructure is that it is widely understood among laypeople and commonly applied in 365 
policy practice. PPP resonates with numerous everyday situations where those who cause 366 
damage are also considered responsible for correcting it, and where it seems fitting that the 367 
level of restitution be proportional to the damage caused (Miller 2005).   368 
 369 
                                                                                                                                                        
companies can or should be held responsible for actions committed jointly by their members or for 
actions committed by one or more individual members (Feinberg 1970).  While we do not deny that 
collective moral responsibility can be invoked in certain situations, we felt this principle was less 
relevant to our question than the others for several reasons.  First, in the advanced industrial societies 
that are dealing with this new distributive problem, ideas of moral agency, acts, causation, and fault 
tend all to be aligned in notions of individual rather than collective responsibility.  The result is that 
normative fairness criteria are more likely to find acceptance among likely ‘users’ if they are based on 
these more familiar notions of individual responsibility.  Second and more pragmatically, collective 
moral responsibility does not get us a great way off the starting block in terms of dividing up a real, 
concrete fiscal burden, which is the problem policymakers currently face.  If responsibility for a 
burden is deemed ‘collective’, then the problem of how to practically distribute it within the given 
collective entity still remains.  Third, there are philosophers who believe in individual responsibility 
and philosophers who believe in individual and collective responsibility, but no-one to our knowledge 
who believes in collective responsibility only.  If anything, then, it would be appropriate to treat 
collective responsibility as supplemental to the principles considered here.   
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PPP underpins international environmental agreements like the 1992 Rio Declaration on 370 
Environment and Development and it currently influences the allocation of mitigation 371 
responsibilities in international climate negotiations (Schwartz 2010; UNFCC 1992).  PPP is 372 
typically embodied in the requirement to purchase GHG emission permits and to pay taxes on 373 
GHG emissions (Cramton and Kerr 2002). PPP forms the moral foundation for the 374 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA – 375 
colloquially, ‘Superfund’ law) in the US5 that requires polluters to clean up hazardous waste 376 
sites that they were responsible for causing.  In the EU, PPP forms the basis for extending the 377 
responsibility of product manufacturers for the products they produce, to the point in the 378 
lifecycle of those products where they become waste, creating an environmental burden.  EU 379 
Directives on packaging, electrical waste and end-of-life vehicles are premised on extended 380 
producer responsibility (Lindhqvist 2000).  381 
 382 
One common objection to PPP is that it does not take into account the issue of excusably 383 
ignorant polluters or pollution which occurs in order to meet basic needs.  Two modifications 384 
can accommodate these concerns (Caney 2005; Miller 2004).  In instances where a polluter 385 
cannot reasonably be expected to know that her pollution might cause harmful consequences, 386 
there is an argument that she should be exempt from paying for the damage caused.  Hence, if 387 
there was neither an intent to harm others nor willful neglect, the agent’s behavior is 388 
excusably ignorant and her liability to pay should be reduced or cancelled. However, an 389 
appeal to excusable ignorance is unlikely to be compelling, given current levels of awareness 390 
of GHG pollution and its possible effects, at least in advanced industrial societies.  Second, to 391 
the question of meeting basic needs, there is considerable normative force in the idea that for 392 
poor and disadvantaged households in particular, some pollution is an unavoidable side effect 393 
of the actions they need to perform to uphold an acceptable standard of living. Given that all 394 
persons have a moral prerogative to ensure an even minimally decent life for themselves, 395 
they should thus be exempt from paying for their pollution. 396 
  397 
Another practical objection to PPP is deciding who exactly the polluters are.  In the present 398 
context, this translates into finding ways to assign responsibility for pollution either to 399 
households in their capacity as consumers of polluting goods and services, or to the 400 
companies that produce and sell these goods and services.  Insofar as this challenge is a 401 
                                                 
5 And many others – see Robertson (1996). 
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practical one, it appears surmountable.  While counterfactuals can never be fully known, 402 
several technical methods exist for apportioning responsibility for pollution among 403 
consumers and/or producers and/or tracing responsibility to agents for discrete pollution 404 
flows. These include the ‘geographical’ approach, the ‘consumer responsibility’ approach, 405 
and the ‘carbon emissions added’ approach (see Bastianoni et al 2004 in this journal for 406 
example).  This kind of technical analysis could be applied in policy design and 407 
implementation at the level of the individual country or policy.6   408 
 409 
If the task of distributing a clean energy infrastructure burden were guided solely by the logic 410 
of PPP, then the distributional arrangement might look as follows.  All entities deemed 411 
responsible for pollution would be made to share the cost of the policy in proportion to their 412 
current pollution flows, if those exceed what is necessary to meet their basic needs.  413 
Practically this could take the form of a direct tax on GHG pollution or it could be proxied for 414 
by fuel or energy consumption.  Implementation might entail establishing a threshold 415 
pollution level below which a household’s contribution is reduced.7  In some country 416 
contexts, depending on the level of formal education, an additional threshold for excusable 417 
ignorance and basic needs might be established.  It remains to be decided who should pay in 418 
place of those exempted for either reason. 419 
   420 
3.2. Ability to Pay Principle 421 
 422 
ATPP holds that the burden of paying for public activities generally should be borne in 423 
greater proportion by agents who are best able to contribute (Broome 1984; Dodge 2005).  In 424 
the context of mitigating pollution damage this means that agents who are most capable of 425 
                                                 
6 Indeed it appears that this objection really must be dealt with at the policy implementation level, not 
least because the definition of ‘pollution’ itself varies across country contexts and time.  Strictly 
speaking, ‘emissions’ are not the same thing as ‘pollution’.  Following Alder (1995): 
 
‘Pollution is the imposition of a harmful waste product or emission onto the person or 
property of another without that person’s consent; it is a ‘trespass’ under principles of 
common law.  If the trespass is so minor that it creates no impact or inconvenience for the 
property owner, it will normally be tolerated.’ 
 
This means that a marginal unit of GHG emission may qualify as pollution in one country but not in 
another if the countries have different allowable emission limits. 
 
7 This is an adaptation of the proposals of Caney (2005) and (Hyams 2009) to allocate a pollution 
quota to all citizens that is sufficient for meeting basic needs. 
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preventing pollution should shoulder the cost of doing so regardless of whether they 426 
themselves caused or continue to cause it (Caney 2014; Miller 2001). 427 
 428 
ATPP forms the theoretical justification for trying to achieve distributive fairness in tax 429 
policy through a tax regime that asks the rich to pay more than the poor, in absolute or 430 
relative terms (Samuelson 1947).  Pigou is often credited with arguing that if tax policy were 431 
guided by a principle of ‘least aggregate sacrifice’ by society, this would effectively lead to 432 
the ATPP (1932).  Minimizing the aggregate sacrifice (in terms of utility or welfare) 433 
associated with raising a particular sum of money requires that, at the margin, everyone make 434 
an equal utility sacrifice.  Given that the rich suffer less disutility from making payments of a 435 
given absolute size, this means that they should pay more.  This argument for ATPP therefore 436 
rests on the idea of diminishing marginal utility of income: the disutility of paying a certain 437 
amount of money is smaller for high-income than low-income agents (Greene and Baron 438 
2001; Samuelson 1937).  It also rests on the normative position that mitigation should be 439 
done at the lowest possible aggregate disutility (utilitarianism), which implies spreading the 440 
marginal mitigation burden evenly across agents, but not necessarily the mitigation cost 441 
(Singer 2010; Stern 2007).8  The ‘burden’ is different from the ‘cost’ because marginal utility 442 
decreases with income, meaning the burden (disutility) of paying a certain cost (sum of 443 
money) is greater for the poor than for the rich. 444 
 445 
In its agnosticism with regards to who actually causes pollution, ATPP may come across as 446 
alien to ordinary moral thinking, eschewing, as it does, the notion of taking responsibility for 447 
one’s own harmful actions.  It assigns responsibility on the basis of a pre-existing status or 448 
condition - namely an agent’s relative wealth, income, or ability - rather than on the basis of 449 
agents’ pollution-related behavior.  However, it is likely that applying the principle in 450 
practice would sit comfortably alongside the more intuitively appealing PPP, because richer 451 
agents who are more able to shoulder the mitigation burden tend also to emit more.  452 
 453 
                                                 
8 However, utilitarianism is not the only ethical framework that can support the ATPP. The closely related  
‘prioritarianism’ holds that the ideal cost distribution is one which additionally meets the requirement that the 
already worst-off (in utility terms) should incur a lesser reduction in their utility levels than the better-off 
(Broome 2012, Parfit 1984). This yields a version of the ATPP which apportions an even greater share of the 
cost to the wealthy, relative to the poor. Most versions of egalitarianism would produce similar 
recommendations. 
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Applied to the problem of distributing the cost of clean energy, ATPP would assign a 454 
minimal cost burden to poor households, even where they were responsible for a large 455 
amount of pollution, whereas better-off households would bear greater responsibility solely 456 
on the basis that they are better off (more able to pay).  It would be consistent with ATPP to 457 
pay for these projects with funds raised by progressive general taxation.  It would not be 458 
consistent to pay with funds raised by a flat tax or through a fixed levy on consumer energy 459 
bills.  Raising the funds through a variable charge linked to energy consumption would be 460 
consistent with ATPP to the extent that consumption of these goods increases proportionally 461 
with income.9 462 
 463 
3.3. Beneficiary Pays Principle 464 
 465 
BPP states that whoever has benefitted from the pollution that has harmed or will harm others 466 
owes compensation to the victims of that harm.  The more an agent has benefitted, the more 467 
she is liable to pay.  BPP has arisen in climate policy discussions in response to the idea that 468 
the current generation in industrialized countries should not be made to pay for their 469 
ancestors’ pollution.  BPP answers this point by saying that the current generation in 470 
industrialized countries should pay something for their ancestors’ pollution because the 471 
current generation has substantially benefitted from that pollution through developmental 472 
progress and higher incomes.  It says that in situations where PPP breaks down because the 473 
polluters are dead (the ‘disappearing emitters problem’), the agents who benefitted from the 474 
pollution should inherit responsibility for correcting the damage caused by it.  BPP’s core 475 
idea is that if an agent accepts the benefits of illegitimate actions then they should also accept 476 
responsibility for the costs (Page 2008, 2012).  477 
 478 
BPP is distinct because it implies that the beneficiaries are obliged to pay not simply because 479 
they are better off than others, but because their wealth was created in a morally dubious 480 
manner. Beneficiaries are thus ‘free-riding’ on the harmful activities of polluters, meaning 481 
that they are no more deserving of this windfall than the victims of pollution are deserving of 482 
their misfortune (Gosseries 2004).  BPP is most salient in the international-intergenerational 483 
context discussed above but it can also be brought to bear on the clean energy infrastructure 484 
                                                 
9 Empirical studies of energy expenditure in the UK and elsewhere show that household energy 
expenditure generally increases with income, but that the increase is less than proportional and 
happens at an uneven rate (OECD 2008; Jamasb and Meier 2010). 
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distributive problem within just one country and one generation. In such a context, where 485 
polluters are still alive, advocates of BPP face two options. The first is to simply defer to PPP 486 
and argue that BPP only applies when polluters are dead. The other is to maintain that agents 487 
should be made to pay in proportion to how much they benefit from polluting activities, 488 
regardless of who is responsible for the pollution. 489 
 490 
The relevance of the second option can be illustrated in this narrower context by analogy to 491 
theft.  Consider that there are three agents in this example: a thief, a victim, and a finder.  Say 492 
that the thief steals some goods from the victim and then that the third agent, the finder, 493 
stumbles across the stolen goods by accident.  The finder would benefit from keeping the 494 
goods.  However, the rightful owner was harmed by having their property stolen, and has a 495 
legitimate moral claim to not suffer this harm, and this claim creates a duty for others.  If the 496 
finder keeps the discovered goods, she may not have harmed anyone because she did not steal 497 
anything herself, but she does have some duty to the rightful owner of the goods and should 498 
ideally return them.   499 
 500 
BPP argues that the direct beneficiaries of pollution (the finder) are duty-bound to 501 
compensate those who are set to suffer a welfare loss (the victim) due to the actions by a 502 
potential third party (the thief) that made the beneficiaries’ wealth possible (Baatz 2013).  503 
Two points give BPP its normative force.  The first is the causal connection it draws between 504 
the agent that benefits from pollution on the one hand, and the victim who is harmed by 505 
pollution on the other; the benefit and the harm share the same cause.  Second is the idea that 506 
the balance of justice between the two agents deserves to be restored through compensation 507 
(Huseby 2013).10 508 
 509 
BPP is subject to several criticisms as a principle by which to ensure distributive justice in 510 
climate policy generally.  The first objection is that the victims of severe misfortune or 511 
natural catastrophe should still have their needs seen to ‘without relying on the rather 512 
accidental connection between the innocent beneficiary and the victim’ (Kingston 2014; 513 
                                                 
10 This is different from the idea that those who benefit from mitigation should pay for it. Having the 
beneficiaries of mitigation pay polluters not to pollute would be a form of Coasian bargaining (Coase 
1960). Under certain restrictive conditions, this could sustain a Pareto efficient outcome (no 
externalities), but by the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, the welfare 
distribution in this outcome is contingent on the welfare distribution prior to bargaining. Therefore, 
the outcome would only guarantee distributive fairness if this was ensured by way of lump-sum 
transfers before or after bargaining. 
17 
 
Huseby 2013).  Sufferers have reason to be compensated for their loss for reasons other than 514 
that another agent benefitted from the event that caused it.  Second is the objection that some 515 
pollution is conceivably not beneficial to anyone, or at least not to any currently living 516 
people, such as pollution that results from arson or accidental fires (Butt 2007).  BPP gives no 517 
clear guidance on who should pay for emissions that do not benefit anyone.  Third, there is 518 
the practical difficulty of causally linking all or some of an individual’s relative wealth or 519 
advantage to specific polluting activities, particularly when those activities were performed 520 
by an agent other than the beneficiary (Maltais 2010).  Unlike PPP, which comes with its own 521 
challenges in terms of assigning responsibility for pollution, we are not aware of technical 522 
methods that would clearly identify beneficiaries of pollution with enough precision and to 523 
the extent that they are different from the polluters themselves. Fourth, because BPP is 524 
concerned with restoring the balance of justice between victim and beneficiary, it may be 525 
better described as a form of corrective justice with distributional implications than a 526 
principle of distributive justice in its own right (Butt 2009).   527 
 528 
In practical terms, distributing the cost of clean energy infrastructure according to BPP alone 529 
might look like this.  First, a baseline contribution that was perfectly equal across households 530 
would be established, by dividing the total cost by the number of households.  The per-531 
household contribution would then be increased for households whose income is traceable to 532 
verifiably harmful pollution (the beneficiaries) and reduced by the same amount for 533 
households who are harmed by that pollution (victims). Assuming that the practical problem 534 
of identifying the beneficiaries of pollution could be overcome, BPP might be implemented 535 
by asking owners of stocks and shares in pollution-intensive companies to pay above the 536 
baseline, or by asking households with employment in pollution-intensive companies to pay 537 
more. 538 
 539 
3.4. Grandfathering Principle 540 
 541 
GFP states that the right to pollute today and in the future should be distributed in proportion 542 
to the amount of pollution agents have emitted in the past.  Agents who emitted heavily 543 
should be allowed to continue to emit at those levels, even for example after new GHG 544 
mitigation rules come into force.  Generally speaking, ‘grandfathering’ refers to establishing 545 
a two-tiered standard in law where one set of agents is treated differently based on prior 546 
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status or behavior (Robertson 1996).  GFP is different to the previous three principles in that 547 
it is concerned with the distribution of rights rather than duties.   548 
 549 
There are numerous examples of GFP being applied in policy practice.  Article 10 of the EU 550 
emissions trading directive required Member States to allocate at least 95 percent of GHG 551 
emission allowances free of charge in the trading period ending 2007, and at least 90 percent 552 
in the trading period ending 2012 (Woerdman, Cló and Arcuri 2008).  Grandfathering clauses 553 
are included in several major US environmental laws including the Resource Conservation 554 
and Recovery Act, the Clean Air Act, and various land use and zoning laws (Robertson 555 
1996). 556 
 557 
The intuition that underpins GFP is familiar from other contexts where groups or individuals 558 
lay claim to public resources through tradition or inheritance.  One example is cattle grazing 559 
rights on public land. In many countries, grazing rights are commonly allocated in 560 
recognition of which populations, groups or families have historically used particular lands 561 
for that purpose (Raymond 2003).  GFP can be understood more broadly to support the idea 562 
that some rights are acquired rather than granted, which can be seen as acceptable so long as 563 
the tradition or practice which created the claim to these rights was legitimate (Ringius et al 564 
2002). While there are indeed differences between GHG emissions and grazing, not least in 565 
that the former is often not traceable to undisputedly legitimate traditions, some argue that the 566 
moral case for grandfathering rights has similar contours in both cases (Bovens 2011). 567 
 568 
GFP draws some justification from the essentially Lockean idea that past behaviour 569 
establishes a claim to a certain way of doing things in the future.11  It may hence be unfair to 570 
agents that previously invested in assets that emit GHGs for a government to change the rules 571 
governing the operation of those assets, mid-stream in their economic life and in a way that 572 
the agents could not have reasonably anticipated (Menezes et al 2009).  Grandfathering 573 
provides for such agents to be protected from stranded costs or other economic losses they 574 
incur as a result of new anti-pollution rules (Harrison and Radov 2002; Robertson 1996).  575 
GFP can be seen as a way to compensate or protect groups or companies who suffer from 576 
capricious government behavior.   577 
                                                 
11 This justification is strictly Lockean only to the extent that the past behaviour fulfils certain criteria, 
such as being beneficial and tangible – see Raymond (2003). In reality, not all proponents of GFP are 
this restrictive. 
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 578 
A second type of justification for GFP is the Realpolitik idea that the generous entitlements 579 
provided under grandfathering are needed to secure the approval and participation of the 580 
powerful owners of polluting assets in anti-pollution legal frameworks (Gosseries 2004).  581 
Giving away pollution rights may not be a just distributive criterion in itself, but its 582 
application is tolerated in the short term in order to avoid the much worse long-run outcome 583 
of failing to effectively mitigate pollution.  Recognizing this, a common modification to GFP 584 
is to acknowledge historical claims and the necessity of political feasibility in the short term, 585 
but then impose a transitional arrangement whereby historical high-emitters gradually have 586 
their pollution rights reduced over time (Bovens 2011). 587 
 588 
Since GFP is concerned with the distribution of pollution rights rather than mitigation duties, 589 
it needs to be adapted and extended to be meaningful in the context of who should pay for 590 
clean energy infrastructure.  If we interpret the right to emit pollution in the future as 591 
equivalent to the right to not pay for mitigation, this implies that historical polluters should 592 
contribute little to current mitigation efforts, and that historically non-polluting agents should 593 
shoulder the cost instead.  Under a policy like the British Renewables Obligation, which 594 
requires certain large electricity users to purchase certificates guaranteeing that a certain 595 
quantity of clean energy has been produced (Wood and Dow 2011), certificates could be 596 
given away to historical polluters while being sold to historical non-polluters.  Alternately, 597 
historical polluters could be exempted from participating in the policy at all or compensated 598 
outside the framework for the certificates they purchase, for example through adjustments in 599 
the broader tax code.  Since this outcome would run contrary to many notions of individual 600 
and historical responsibility and so risk public non-acceptance (Neumayer 2000), a 601 
‘transitional’ application of the principle might provide for distributing the cost of mitigation 602 
differently once the necessary legal regime for avoiding catastrophic damages had been put in 603 
place.  604 
 605 
3.5. Summary 606 
 607 
Table 1 summarizes how much of the clean energy infrastructure cost burden different groups 608 
would pay under each principle. It specifies whether households would pay more, less or the 609 
same, relative to a baseline where everyone pays the same amount, depending on whether 610 
they are high-polluting, low-polluting, wealthy or poor. 611 
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 612 
Table 1: Who pays more or less for clean energy infrastructure under each principle 613 
 614 
 High-polluting 
households 
Low-polluting 
households 
Wealthy 
households 
Poor 
households 
Polluter Pays More* Less* Same Same 
Ability to Pay Same Same More Less 
Beneficiary 
Pays 
Same Same More** Less** 
Grandfathering Less§ More§ Same Same 
*Except where emissions are a consequence of excusable ignorance and/or the fulfillment of basic 615 
needs 616 
**Provided that wealth differences are traceable to benefits from pollution 617 
§Under an interpretation of duties rather than rights  618 
 619 
4. Criteria for evaluating distributive fairness  620 
 621 
Here we use the four principles to develop three normative criteria against which to assess 622 
clean energy financing mechanisms.  Our approach combines all four principles to avoid 623 
some of the strongest objections to each principle when taken individually.  The practice of 624 
combining principles is not uncommon among moral philosophers generally (Berlin 1990) 625 
and has several precedents in climate justice discussions specifically (Caney 2005; Miller 626 
2008).  We aim to identify fairness criteria that address the practical problem facing decision 627 
makers discussed in section 2: how to distribute this new cost burden across households 628 
within the current generation, within an individual nation, in a way that the public 629 
understands and supports. 630 
 631 
In developing the fairness criteria we focused on how decision makers might distribute the 632 
burden across households.  This is because households tend to be the social unit governments 633 
use to monitor the degree of socioeconomic inequality in many countries and so make a 634 
sensible unit for thinking about the impact of new distributive decisions.  Households are also 635 
the most relevant social group in the three clean energy roll-out programs in California, 636 
Australia and the UK that we apply the fairness criteria to below, both in terms of program 637 
participants and in terms of payers (either as electricity bill payers or tax-payers).  This 638 
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provides a certain symmetry across agents, payers, and beneficiaries.  That symmetry that lets 639 
us focus on how the burden should be shared across rich and poor households, which we see 640 
as the main practical question facing decision makers today, as opposed to the deeper but 641 
perhaps less urgent political economy question of how such a burden might be shared across 642 
households and corporate entities (firms, governmental entities, other groups). 643 
 644 
Proceeding with the fairness criteria, a first problem decision makers face is deciding which 645 
households should be payers and which households should be non-payers, or stated another 646 
way, whether there are households that should be excluded from paying anything at all.  PPP 647 
and ATPP give the clearest guidance of all the principles on how to define the relevant group 648 
of payers for a burden that is pollution-correcting. PPP states that polluters should pay in 649 
proportion to their pollution. This implies that households that do not currently pollute should 650 
not pay.12 ATPP states that only those who are financially able to pay should do so, thus 651 
exempting those who are considered unable to shoulder the costs. 652 
 653 
GFP can also be invoked to separate non-payers from payers, though the number of affected 654 
households is likely to be small.  GFP implies that some households have ‘acquired’ the right 655 
to continue to pollute and by extension that they should be excused from paying, due to past 656 
decisions they took in relation to pollution.  This could be the case for households that 657 
previously installed polluting electricity generation equipment at their residences under the 658 
reasonable belief that they would not be asked one day to contribute to a clean energy 659 
infrastructure program.  This exemption would not apply to all households that previously 660 
polluted through general electric grid electricity consumption however, because someone else 661 
took the polluting investment decision on those households’ behalf and so it is someone else 662 
that would be harmed by unforeseeable government action.  These exemptions would only be 663 
                                                 
12 Another possible and considerably narrower interpretation of PPP holds that it would be unfair to 
ask a household to pay for a policy that reduces a polluting activity (e.g., coal-fired power generation) 
if said household had no part in this activity (e.g., does not consume electricity).  In the clean energy 
context, this would imply exempting households that are not connected to the electric grid but may 
have substantial pollution from other activities, such as driving.  A problem with this narrower 
interpretation is that its validity depends heavily on policy context.  It may be seen as ‘fair’ when 
parallel programs exist to mitigate automobile pollution and driving-only polluters are made to pay 
for those programs; it could be seen as ‘unfair’ when those programs are not in place because driving-
only polluters ‘pollute for free’.  This distinction may not be practically important because there are 
likely to be very few households that cause driving pollution without causing electric grid pollution, 
meaning the number of exempted households would be very small.         
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justifiable under an interpretation of GFP that extends a right to pollute to an entitlement to 664 
not mitigate. 665 
 666 
It could also be justifiable under GFP to temporarily exclude some households from paying if 667 
this were necessary to secure the political support needed to realize the program.  The 668 
households excluded under this Realpolitik justification would be the politically powerful 669 
ones that would otherwise block the program entirely and which require special concession to 670 
acquiesce.  They would then begin to pay after some mutually-agreed period of adjustment 671 
for example. 672 
 673 
Together these principles give a basis for circumscribing a group of payer households in the 674 
clean energy infrastructure context. 675 
 676 
Criterion A (only financially able polluters should pay): the cost of a clean energy 677 
infrastructure program should be borne by the households that consume the goods and 678 
services that cause the pollution that the new infrastructure is intended to correct, and are also 679 
financially able to shoulder this cost.  Households that have zero current pollution or satisfy 680 
restrictive conditions under the grandfathering principle may be excluded. 681 
 682 
Decision makers also face the question of how to distribute program costs across households 683 
with different pollution levels and income characteristics once the relevant group of payers 684 
has been established. Again, we can look to more than one principle for guidance. Under 685 
PPP, fairness is present when a household’s payment is proportional to its current pollution 686 
level.  The more pollution it causes, the more it needs to pay in order to undo the total 687 
pollution damage. Under BPP, fairness is present when a household’s payment is 688 
proportional to the benefit or windfall it derives from polluting activities. The greater the 689 
benefit it enjoys, the more it needs to pay in order to surrender the entirety of the benefit that 690 
is traceable to pollution. Under ATPP, fairness is present when a household’s payment is 691 
proportional to its ability to make the payment. This implies spreading the absolute money 692 
cost unequally (i.e., proportionally to unequally distributed income), but the felt burden of 693 
making the assigned payment should be similar for all households. 694 
 695 
Exactly how payments are linked to these metrics will depend on country context and 696 
program-specific factors, and choosing among them and appropriately implementing them in 697 
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practice is a question for individual decision makers. In practice, all three types of 698 
proportionality (pollution, windfall or ability) may produce similar policy outcomes, 699 
depending on the correlation between income and consumption of polluting goods and 700 
services. 701 
 702 
The basic idea of proportionality in household payments is captured in our second criterion. 703 
 704 
Criterion B (proportional payments should be charged to paying households): The program 705 
cost should be apportioned among paying households in a variable rather than a fixed manner 706 
and in proportion to the level of pollution, the level of benefit derived from that pollution, 707 
and/or income or other indicator of ability. 708 
 709 
Today’s decision-makers are acting in a context of historically high and rising levels of 710 
socioeconomic inequality in several countries.  They should be sensitive to the risk of 711 
worsening the material position of the lowest-income households in absolute terms.  ATPP 712 
addresses this concern because it imposes a level of payment on the poorest households that 713 
does not exceed their ‘ability’ to pay.  Modified versions of PPP state that the level of 714 
payment, which is pollution-linked, should be reduced or eliminated to the extent that 715 
polluting is necessary to meet their basic needs. 716 
 717 
In our research here and elsewhere (Grover 2013) we have found that decision–makers can 718 
reach financing arrangements for clean energy infrastructure programs that spread program 719 
costs across all types of households, but which overlook the distribution of program benefits.  720 
This is because higher income households tend to participate more in these programs than 721 
lower-income households.  This means that even if decision-makers achieve fairness in the 722 
proximate distribution of program costs, fairness can be eroded on the benefit-distribution 723 
side when participation across social groups is variable. 724 
 725 
None of the four principles gives clear guidance on the distribution of program benefits but 726 
because this is an integral part of the overall incidence of these programs, the third criterion is 727 
designed to protect the most vulnerable households, including on the benefit-distribution 728 
side.. 729 
 730 
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Criterion C (welfare levels of the lowest-income households should be protected): the 731 
program should make concrete provisions to protect low-income households against declines 732 
in welfare either by reducing payments where pollution is necessary to meet basic needs, 733 
and/or by ensuring that these households share substantially in the benefits of the program, 734 
thus offsetting the cost. 735 
 736 
We now apply these criteria to clean energy roll-out programs in Australia, California and the 737 
UK.   738 
 739 
 740 
5. Evaluation of clean energy programs 741 
 742 
Here we apply the fairness criterion to small scale and household-level deployment programs 743 
in California, Britain and the UK.  For each of the three programs we describe: aims and 744 
design, total expected implementation cost, total expected uptake or participation, the origin 745 
of the funds to pay for the program, and any safeguards or provisions that were put in place to 746 
promote distributive fairness.  We then evaluate each program against the fairness criteria. 747 
 748 
 749 
We acknowledge that the distributive arrangements behind these programs may not be 750 
representative of the arrangements behind commercial and industrial scale programs.  The 751 
aim of this paper is to broach the fairness issue in this context and to use real examples to 752 
illustrate what it means for policy.  Elucidation is our objective, more than representativeness.  753 
That said, small-scale and household capacity is estimated to account for one-quarter of all 754 
annual renewables capacity investment globally in 2015 (USD 73 billion) (UNEP and BNEF 755 
2015).13 756 
 757 
Table 2 summarizes the main features of the programs and our fairness evaluation. 758 
                                                 
13 We also recognise that there are other costs of deploying renewables beyond the capital cost.  We 
are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the substantial additional costs related to 
connecting and distributing electricity produced by this new infrastructure.  We note that in the 
Flanders region of Belgium and in the US states of Arizona and Idaho, specific fees have been 
imposed on installation owners per kilowatt of installed capacity to cover these costs, and it seems 
reasonable the issues raised in this paper apply to the distributive arrangements under those programs 
as well. 
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 759 
 760 
 761 
 762 
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Table 2: Summary of fairness evaluation of clean energy roll-out programs 763 
 Expected cost Number of 
installations 
Criterion A: Only 
financially able 
polluters should pay 
Criterion B: 
Proportional payments 
should be charged to 
paying households 
Criterion C: welfare 
levels of the lowest-
income households should 
be protected 
Australian Photovoltaic Rebate Program 
(2000-2010) 
AUD 1.1 billion 109,634 Not satisfied Satisfied Satisfied 
British Feed-in Tariff for small scale PV 
(2010-2015) 
GBP 8-10 billion 683,322* Partly satisfied Not satisfied Not satisfied 
California Solar Energy Initiative (2007-
2014) 
USD 2.2 billion 156,704 Partly satisfied Not satisfied Satisfied 
*To date (mid-2015). 764 
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 765 
5.1. The Australian Photovoltaic Rebate Program 766 
 767 
Australia initiated the Photovoltaic Rebate Program (PVRP) in 2000 to promote the uptake of 768 
solar PV installations.14  Program objectives were to promote the uptake of clean energy at 769 
homes and community buildings, to reduce GHG emissions, to spur the development of the 770 
Australian solar PV industry, and to increase public awareness and acceptance of renewable 771 
energy (Australian Department of the Environment 2006; Australian National Audit Office 772 
2010). 773 
 774 
The PVRP pursued these aims by providing a cash rebate to individuals who registered PV 775 
installations under the program.  The level of the incentive changed over time, but at its peak 776 
was AUD 8 per watt of installed capacity up to a maximum of AUD 8,000.  This was around 777 
40 percent of the total capital cost of an installation at the time.  The government agency 778 
administering the program paid the rebate directly to individual applicants. 779 
 780 
Program records show that 109,634 PV installations registered and received the rebate over 781 
the life of the program (January 2000 to April 2010).  Total installed capacity was 782 
approximately 128 MW which is equivalent to about 1/3rd the capacity of a standard coal-783 
fired power plant.  The vast majority of systems were installed at domestic premises. 784 
 785 
The Australian National Audit Office estimates the total cost of the program at AUD 1.1 786 
billion (2010).  The PRVP was funded by the Australian federal government through a 787 
budget allocation secured during budget negotiations in 1999.  The allocation was partly 788 
motivated by a need to compensate certain groups in respect of changes that were to be made 789 
to the national tax system.  The PRVP was also motivated into existence by the Australian 790 
government’s pursuit of AUD 1 billion in voluntary GHG reduction initiatives in lieu of 791 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.  This included establishing the Australian Greenhouse Office 792 
(AGO), in 1998, which would come to administer the ‘Measures for a Better Environment’ 793 
package that funded the PVRP.  That package included the following allocations (Lyster and 794 
Bradbrook 2006): 795 
 796 
                                                 
14 The new Labour government rebranded the PVRP the ‘Australian Solar Homes and Communities 
Program’ after it came into power in November 2007. 
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 AUD 400 million for activities that were likely to result in substantial emissions 797 
reductions or substantial sink enhancement especially in the first Kyoto Protocol 798 
commitment period (2008-2010). 799 
 AUD 179.9 million to increase the uptake of renewable energy in remote areas and 800 
especially to meet the energy needs of indigenous people. 801 
 AUD 34.6 million for the PRVP whose aim was to encourage the long-term use of 802 
photovoltaic technology. 803 
 AUD 71.4 million for a program to promote urban emission reductions and air quality 804 
improvement through vehicle fuel conversion. 805 
 AUD 26 million to extend a pre-existing renewable energy commercialisation 806 
program.   807 
The total value of the package was AUD 711.9 million meaning the remainder of the funds to 808 
cover the program must have been made up for by other federal allocations or through other 809 
sources. 810 
 811 
Partly to deal with over-enrollment problems, the Government introduced a means test for 812 
participation in May 2008, which limited eligibility to households with a combined annual 813 
taxable income of less than AUD 100,000 (Australian Department of the Environment 2006).  814 
The means test was partly a response to the government’s own decision to double the rebate 815 
from AUD 4 to AUD 8 per installed watt in May 2007.  The means test was scrapped shortly 816 
before the program was terminated in 2010. 817 
 818 
We now evaluate the cost distribution arrangements underlying the Australian PVRP against 819 
the three distributive fairness criteria. 15 820 
 821 
To evaluate Criterion A we looked for evidence that the program cost was allocated mainly to 822 
well-off polluters.  We do not find strong evidence of this.  The PRVP was paid for out of 823 
general fund revenues raised by the Australian government through general taxation, meaning 824 
there was no deliberate link drawn in program design between paying and polluting 825 
households.  Nor do we find evidence of deliberate exemptions under the program for non-826 
                                                 
15 Several studies have identified concerns about the distribution of the benefits of the Australian 
program as opposed to the distribution of the costs (Macintosh and Wilkinson 2010; Nelson et al 
2011), principally that disproportionate numbers of higher-income households have participated. 
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polluting households or for households financially unable to pay.  We do not find evidence 827 
that Criterion A was fulfilled. 828 
 829 
Under Criterion B we looked for household payment levels that were proportional to ability, 830 
pollution or benefit from pollution.  Because the program was paid for by the Australian 831 
government through general tax revenues, and because the Australian tax system is regarded 832 
as one of the most progressive in the OECD (Australian Government 2015; Paturot et al 833 
2013) in part because of the relief it provides for poor households, we count this as evidence 834 
of a distributive arrangement consistent with the idea of proportional payments, particularly 835 
ability.  We find that criterion B was fully fulfilled. 836 
 837 
For criterion C we looked for program provisions that protected the welfare levels of the 838 
lowest-income households, including on the benefits-distribution side of the program.  We 839 
find that this outcome was achieved by funding the program through general tax revenues and 840 
also by implementing the means test, which concentrated more of the benefits of the program 841 
on lower-income households, thus reducing their net payments.  We find that criterion C was 842 
fully fulfilled.   843 
 844 
 845 
5.2. The British Feed-in Tariff for small scale installations 846 
 847 
The British Feed-in Tariff (FiT) encourages uptake of small-scale clean energy installations 848 
including PV.  It aims to fulfill the requirements of the EU Directive on Electricity 849 
Production from Renewable Energy Sources (2001/77/ED), which requires the UK to 850 
produce at least 15 percent of gross electricity consumption from clean sources by 2020 851 
(DECC 2011). 852 
 853 
The program began in April 2010 and guarantees a regular payment to installation owners for 854 
the clean energy they produce.  The payment varies by installation size and type but a typical 855 
household installation received around GBP 0.38 per kWh in the first year of the program and 856 
was receiving around GBP 0.10 at the time of writing.  Program records show that 683,322 857 
installations had registered at the time of writing (July 2015).  Ninety-one percent of installations 858 
are PV and 97 percent are installed at domestic premises.  The total cost of the program over its 859 
25-year program life is estimated at between GBP 8 and 10 billion (DECC 2009).  860 
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 861 
The program is paid for by electricity customers through electricity bill levies.  A key 862 
distributive decision in program design was to allow the electricity suppliers to decide how to 863 
distribute this cost across their customer bases.  By doing so the government relinquished 864 
control over deciding how much different household types pay. 865 
 866 
Under fairness Criterion A we looked for evidence that the program cost was allocated 867 
mainly to financially able polluting households.  We find that the funding method, which 868 
links households’ payments to their consumption of a polluting good (main-grid electricity), 869 
is likely to link paying households to polluting households more closely than a strategy of 870 
funding the program through general tax revenue.  However, we do not find any evidence of 871 
exemptions for households that are financially unable to pay.  This outcome arises at least 872 
partly from the program design decision to allow the electricity suppliers to decide how to the 873 
program cost is passed on, with apparently little or no government oversight.  We therefore 874 
find that criterion A is only partly fulfilled. 875 
 876 
Under Criterion B we looked for evidence that program costs were spread across households 877 
in a way that was proportional to their ability to pay, pollution, or benefit from pollution.  878 
Again, the decision to allow electricity suppliers to determine how payments were spread 879 
across households creates, at the very least, opacity around how much households of different 880 
types pay.  We do not find evidence that Criterion B was fulfilled. 881 
 882 
Under Criterion C we looked for program provisions that protect the lowest-income 883 
households.  We find no evidence of this on either the cost- or benefit-distribution side of the 884 
program.  Even if the electric utilities decided to distribute the cost across households 885 
according to income or some proxy for it, this would have happened in spite of the program 886 
design, not because of it.  We do not find evidence that Criterion C was fulfilled. 887 
 888 
5.3. The California Solar Energy Initiative 889 
 890 
The California Solar Energy Initiative (CSI) aimed to install 1,940 MW of distributed solar 891 
PV capacity and to transform the market for solar energy systems so that prices become 892 
‘competitive and self-sustaining’ (CPUC 2014).  It started in 2007 and is winding down at the 893 
time of writing. 894 
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 895 
The program uses two separate incentives to achieve these aims.  The first is a feed-in tariff-896 
like payment made to installation owners for each kWh of electricity produced.  This 897 
incentive supports installations larger than 30 KW.  Actual payments range from USD 0.43 to 898 
0.04 per kWh depending on how much capacity has already been installed under the program.  899 
Under the second incentive the installation owner receives a single upfront payment for each 900 
watt installed, ranging from USD 2.75 to 0.37, again depending on the level of program 901 
installed capacity (CPUC 2013). 902 
 903 
Program data shows that 148,894 installations had registered under the program by February 904 
2015 for an estimated 1,900 MW of installed solar PV capacity (California Solar Statistics 905 
2015).  Approximately 93 percent of installations are residential or small commercial systems 906 
(Borenstein 2013). 907 
 908 
In 2006, the California State Legislature set the program budget at USD 2.167 billion for the 909 
10-year life of the program.  The legislature specifically authorized the funds to be collected 910 
from electricity customers.  It also intended that the impact of the program on electricity 911 
customers’ bills be cost-neutral, meaning it be, in the Legislature’s words:  912 
 913 
‘. . . a cost effective investment by rate payers in peak electricity generation capacity 914 
where rate payers recoup the cost of their investment through lower rates as a result of 915 
avoiding purchases of electricity at peak rates, with additional system and pollution 916 
reduction benefits.’ (2006: 83) 917 
 918 
The program explicitly supports participation by low- and very low-income households.  The 919 
legislature set aside 10 percent of the total USD 2.167 billion program budget for this purpose 920 
and stated an aim of installing 190 MW of solar PV capacity within this demographic by 921 
2016.  A different and more generous incentive system applies to low-income households and 922 
is non-declining over time.  Households whose income is less than 50 or 80 percent of the 923 
geographic-area mean can qualify for highly or fully subsidized PV systems, respectively.  924 
The California Public Utilities Commission estimated that 5,000 low-income households and 925 
1,800 very low-income households would be eligible for these systems through incentives, 926 
tax credits and other financing mechanisms.  The program facilitates low-interest loans for 927 
any remaining system cost. 928 
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 929 
We find that Criterion A was partly fulfilled because the California legislature took a decision 930 
to spread the cost across electricity-using households, which as discussed above draws a 931 
closer link between payers and polluters than funding the program through general taxation.  932 
However as under the UK program we do not find that there was a provision in place to 933 
ensure the program cost was born by financially able households.  We also recognize the 934 
California Legislature’s intent that electricity bill payers as a group recover the program 935 
investment through lower electricity rates, making the program cost neutral overall, but we 936 
find no evidence that this arrangement nullified the contribution of households that were 937 
financially unable to pay, either in intent or in practice. 938 
 939 
Under Criterion B we looked for household payment levels that were proportionally linked to 940 
household ability to pay, pollution, or benefit from pollution.  Despite looking through a wide 941 
range of policy design documents concerned with fiscal aspects of the program we do not 942 
find any evidence of this.  We therefore do not find evidence that Criterion B was fulfilled.      943 
 944 
Under Criterion C we looked for program design decisions that deliberately protected the 945 
absolute and/or relative welfare levels of the lowest-income households.  We find clear 946 
evidence of this in the form of the decision to ring fence 10 percent of the total program 947 
budget for participation by low- and very-low income households.  We find fairness Criterion 948 
C fully fulfilled. 949 
 950 
 951 
6. Conclusions: towards fairness  952 
Globally, subsidies for clean energy deployment represent a large new public spending 953 
burden with potentially important implications for distributive fairness across households 954 
within countries and within the current generation.  Our contributions in this paper have been 955 
to identify established principles of distributive fairness that are relevant in this new policy 956 
context, to adapt and apply these principles to yield three normative fairness criteria, and to 957 
use the criteria to illustrate in the context of three real deployment programs when fairness 958 
may and may not be present.  Throughout, our aim has been to produce tangible insight and 959 
guidance for decision makers on this new issue. 960 
 961 
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Our message for policymakers is that distributive fairness under these programs is a 962 
legitimate concern that becomes more important in a context of historically high levels of 963 
within-country economic inequality.  Decision makers can begin to address this concern by 964 
holding up program design decisions against the normative fairness criterion we developed 965 
here, to examine the distributive implications of those decisions.  We have shown that 966 
program designs may be fairer, or less unfair, if decision makers consider which agents 967 
should be payers and which should be non-payers, if they are guided by the principle of 968 
proportionality in how they distribute the cost across paying households, and if they also 969 
include provisions to protect the lowest-income agents, including on the benefit-distribution 970 
side of these programs.  971 
 972 
It remains to point out several caveats to our findings for users of this research.  The first is 973 
that our aim has not been to discuss intra-generational fairness in any generality, but rather to 974 
provide specific and practical guidance to policymakers who are interested in spreading the 975 
cost of clean energy infrastructure fairly, particularly in situations where households are 976 
expected to shoulder the cost. 977 
 978 
The second is that clean energy deployment programs can be motivated into existence by 979 
policy aims other than mitigating GHG emissions, such as energy security and economic 980 
development.  Our findings are most relevant to guiding distributive decisions insofar as 981 
these programs are motivated by GHG mitigation.  That does not mean that our findings are 982 
irrelevant to distributive decisions in programs motivated by other reasons, but rather that 983 
there may be different nuances to notions of distributive fairness under other policy aims.  984 
The presence of other aims emphatically do not nullify the need for a fair distribution of 985 
costs. 986 
 987 
A third caveat is that the proximate distributive incidence of a program may be different to 988 
the final distributive incidence, and that decision makers should ultimately be concerned with 989 
the latter.  One way to address this issue is by focusing on the distributive impact on 990 
households as we have done here, as these agents may have fewer options for passing on the 991 
cost to other entities.  Still, decision makers can take steps to avoid unintended distributive 992 
outcomes by, for example, using computable general equilibrium analysis to model and 993 
anticipate these impacts, and adjust their design decisions accordingly. 994 
 995 
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A final caveat relates to the degree of transparency decision makers decide to adhere to in the 996 
financing arrangements that underpin these programs.  While we have given limited attention 997 
to notions of procedural fairness in this paper for reasons discussed in section 3, we see 998 
strength in the argument that the best arrangement is one where payers are aware both of how 999 
much they are paying and of why they are paying what they are paying.  The moral-1000 
philosophical and more pragmatic reasoning behind cost distribution decisions are not always 1001 
easy to convey to a public audience, but we hope that our ‘applied’ discussion and application 1002 
of these principles to a concrete policy context will go some way to easing that burden.  1003 
 1004 
 1005 
 1006 
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